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The storage of personal information by service providers en-
tails a significant risk of privacy loss due to data breaches.
One way to mitigate this problem is to limit the amount
of personal information that is provided. Our prior work
on minimal disclosure credentials presented a computation-
ally efficient mechanism to facilitate this capability. In that
work, personal data was broken into individual claims, which
could be released in arbitrary subsets while still being cryp-
tographically verifiable. In expanding the applications for
that work, we encountered the problem of connections be-
tween different claims, which manifest as dependencies on
the release of those claims. In this new work, we provide an
efficient way to provide the same selective disclosure, but
with cryptographic enforcement of dependencies between
claims, as specified by the certifier of the claims. This
constitutes a mechanism for redactable signatures on data
with release dependencies. Our scheme was implemented
and benchmarked over a wide range of input set sizes, and
shown to verify thousands of claims in tens to hundreds of
milliseconds. We also describe ongoing work in which the
approach is being used within a larger system for holding
and dispensing personal health records.
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The amount of personal information that is supplied by
individuals and stored electronically by other entities, pri-
marily service providers, is enormous and growing. This
information ranges from basic (and yet still sensitive) at-
tributes such as name, address, date of birth, and social
security number to payment information, e.g. credit card
numbers and expiration dates, to much more comprehen-
sive personal information such as detailed financial records
and medical records. Unauthorized disclosure of this per-
sonal information is a major problem that has been steadily
increasing in severity over the last several years.
The overarching goal of our research is to give users more
control over their personal information, while also providing
trust in the information that is supplied. An important com-
ponent of our approach is the principle of “least disclosure”,
i.e. that an entity requesting personal information should
be given the minimum amount of information required to
authorize the necessary operation or transaction. Our prior
work developed new redactable signature schemes that were
used to design minimal disclosure digital credentials, which
combine a large set of attributes into a digital credential
with one signature, which can be used to verify any subset
of the attributes [1]. As opposed to a single “all-or-nothing”
credential, this allows the user flexibility to provide some
attributes, while hiding the remaining ones, but it still al-
lows the credential recipient to verify cryptographically and
efficiently the provided attributes. This type of credential
can also be used with policy-driven trust negotiation to re-
duce further the amount of personal information that is dis-
closed [12].
While digital credentials are one application area for min-
imal disclosure technology, it can also be applied to the gen-
eral area of disclosure of sensitive personal information, e.g.
financial records or medical records. Medical record pro-
tection is the subject of the MedVault project [8], which is
a joint undertaking between Georgia Tech and Children’s
Healthcare of Atlanta. Each individual element of personal
information that can be disclosed is referred to as a claim. In
credentials, claims are attribute values. In medical records,
a claim is an individual component of the record, e.g. an
X-ray image or doctor’s notes about an office visit. In a
document that is to be redacted, claims are words.
In certain contexts, claims might be inter-dependent. For
example, a health care provider might not be willing to re-
lease doctor’s notes containing a medical diagnosis unless the
test results on which the diagnosis is based are also released.
In this paper, we consider how to handle claim dependencies
in a minimal disclosure mechanism based on redactable sig-
Figure 1: Basic Merkle Hash Tree
natures. We present the design of a scheme for handling
claim dependencies, and we evaluate both its worst-case
complexity, through analytical evaluation, and its execution
time, through measurement on an actual implementation.
The results show that the efficiency of simple hash-tree-
based redactable signatures can be maintained while han-
dling a useful category of claim dependencies. We close with
discussion of an architecture for use of our mechanism in a
source-verifiable selective-disclosure personal health record
repository.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Scenario and Terminology
We consider a scenario with three types of entities: a
prover, a verifier, and a certifier. A prover holds records
that are certified (cryptographically signed) by a certifier.
The prover wants to convince the verifier that the certifier
did indeed certify the records. However, the prover does not
wish to release all of the records, but just some subset of
them. Additionally, the certifier wishes to restrict the man-
ner in which the records can be released. ”Released” here
refers only to releasing records with evidence that they are
certified (ie, cryptographic proof). The prover can freely
forge (uncertified) records, so the verifier will accept only
certified documents. We refer to an indivisible piece of a
record as a claim, following our earlier credential work.
2.2 Redactable Signature Schemes
This problem arose out of our previous work on minimal
disclosure credentials. [1] In that work, we presented a cre-
dential system based on Merkle hash trees and public-key in-
frastructure (PKI) certificates, which allows some attribute
values to be hidden on a given use of the credential. We also
extended the approach to allow attributes certified by differ-
ent identity providers to be combined into a single credential,
while still allowing the selective disclosure of attributes in
the credential.
2.2.1 Basic Scheme
A Merkle hash tree is a binary tree where each internal
node holds the hash of the concatenated values of its two
children nodes. Ralph Merkle first introduced this structure
as a way to efficiently handle a large number of Lamport
one-time signatures.[9] It has since been adapted for uses
such as the large-scale time-stamping of documents [2] and
tracking data in peer-to-peer networks [3]. A basic tree is
shown in Figure 1.
By the collision-resistance property of a cryptographic
hash function, it should not be possible to find two inputs
that give the same output (under reasonable computational
limits, of course). Therefore, each internal node uniquely
fixes the values of its two children nodes. Extrapolating,
the single root value uniquely fixes the value of all internal
and leaf nodes in the tree. Additionally, it is not necessary to
have all nodes of the tree in order to compute its root value.
Specifically, verifying that a given value for a leaf node of the
tree is correct requires an additional number of nodes equal
to the height of the tree minus one (O(log(n)) with respect
to the size of the tree). Having a trusted authority digitally
sign the root value of the tree provides the equivalent of a
trusted signature on everything in the tree. Replacing a sim-
ple digital signature with a full PKI certificate containing a
public key and meta-data ties the contents of the tree to a
private key through a trusted signature; in short, a digital
credential. Each leaf node in the tree is a claim of a partic-
ular attribute value, which can be verified independently of
all of the other claims in the tree. This basic scheme is es-
sentially equivalent (modulo minor implementation details)
to the redactable signature scheme proposed in [7].
2.2.2 Extension to Multiple Authorities
Credentials in general are issued by many different au-
thorities. For example, various government agencies issue
driver’s licenses, passports, business licenses, building per-
mits, etc. Corporations such as insurance companies, private
colleges, independent testing agencies, and medical providers
all issue different types of certified claims about customers.
It can be advantageous to combine together credentials is-
sued by different authorities for reasons of organization, con-
sistency, and/or (as in our system) computational efficiency.
Even when considering personal information such as health
records, this information can come from a variety of sources,
such as different health care providers and/or doctor’s offices
where a patient has been treated, or from medical devices in-
stalled in a patient’s home, or from personal medical devices
carried by the patient, etc.
In our extended redactable signature scheme, records is-
sued by multiple authorities can be combined together by
modifying the hash tree structure slightly. In the modified
tree, certain nodes have three branches, instead of the nor-
mal two. The third branch, shown as the middle branch
in the example of Figure 2, contains a PKI certificate that
applies to all nodes below the three-branched node. These
three-branched nodes correspond to the root nodes of the
records that were combined together. The whole structure
must be signed by a trusted authority. However, that au-
thority does not need to see (let alone verify) any of the
claims in any of the sub-trees. Rather, this top-level au-
thority only needs to certify that the structure of the tree is
correct.
2.3 Motivation for Dependencies
From a basic credential system, we expanded the scope
of our uses for the credential construct to hold arbitrary
records. In doing so, the issue of dependencies between dif-
ferent data items or between different whole records arose.
Data seldom exists in isolation. Individual pieces of data
are combined to form data, which are combined to form
datasets. Data can be connected via many relationships,
and releasing individual pieces of data ignorant of those re-
lationships often makes no sense. So, we wish to provide a
way for the certifier of data to prevent data from being re-
Figure 2: Combining Signed Trees from Multiple Authorities
leased without respecting the relationships between different
pieces of data. As mentioned previously, ”released” refers
only to releasing the data in a certified form. Uncertified
data is not considered. In this work, relationships between
data are reduced to dependencies between data that must
be satisfied for the data to be released.
3. RELATED WORK
While we are not aware of any other attempts to address
this specific problem of dependencies in releasing certified
data, this work is still related to, or dependent upon, various
prior works.
The most closely related works using graphs or circuits
of dependencies all seem to involve fulfilling such dependen-
cies under a significantly different threat model, for example
[5]. In our system, the most difficult threat is the prover and
verifier collaborating to cheat the certifier. And the thresh-
old of that cheating is low, since the result only has to be
trusted by the verifier, and not by any honest party.
This work can be considered the core of a specialized
redactable signature scheme, although it is meant to be em-
bedded into a separate redactable signature, specifically, our
previous work described in the next section. Redactable sig-
natures were introduced by Johnson, et al., in [7] as one ex-
ample of a larger class of homomorphic signatures. While
the targeted use of the schemes is very different—Johnson,
et al., describe a scenario where the majority of a document
is shown, with a small part redacted, while our work de-
scribes showing a small amount of data and redacting the
majority—the core mechanism is the same.
Privacy preserving trust negotiations associated with the
disclosure of sensitive attributes also have disclosure depen-
dencies among attributes. The user can set up policies where
the other negotiating party has to disclose some attributes
before a particular attribute of the user can be released. We
review some related contributions in this area and contrast
between dependencies in trust negotiation and dependencies
in data disclosure.
In [18], one of the earliest works on negotiating disclo-
sure of sensitive credentials is presented. This work pro-
posed eager and parsimonious strategies and compare their
performance. [16] presented a framework for negotiating re-
lease of sensitive attributes. They discuss several interopera-
ble negotiation strategies for improving privacy. [15] argued
that access control policies protecting sensitive credentials
are themselves sensitive and their disclosure should be lim-
ited. [19] discuss safety in trust negotiations. They present
a formal framework for trust negotiation and analyze safety
of credentials under different negotiation strategies.
One major difference between all these trust negotiation
systems and our proposed system is that the trust negotia-
tion systems are online where they expect the other party
to release credentials online to satisfy the dependencies as
opposed to our offline system where the dependencies are en-
forced cryptographically. Another difference is that in trust
negotiation systems both parties try to satisfy each other’s
policies at run time, whereas in our system the policies re-
sult from natural dependencies in the data set that must be
preserved to release the information in the correct context.
Other systems attempt to limit the disclosure of personal
information/credentials in different ways. For example, in
role-based access control, only a user’s role needs to be dis-
closed and not a more specific identifier [14]. Alternately, by
adding context to role-based access control, policies for ac-
cess can be tightened and made more fine grained, thereby
reducing the amount of unnecessary personal information
retrieved [6]. In a different use of context information, [13]
uses context information (about both the subject and the
querier) to determine what information can be released for
any request. These works do not consider the issue of ver-
ifiability of the data being provided nor its inherent data
dependencies.
4. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Our redactable signature with dependencies consists of
several parts. The first two parts are the PKI certificate and
Merkle hash tree as used in our prior work and described in
the previous section. The interesting and novel part is the
handling of the dependencies.
4.1 Dependency Graph
Dependencies between data can come in many forms. The
simplest form is a single ”depends upon” relationship, such
as ”claim 1 depends upon claim 2”, which means that ”claim
1” should not be released without also releasing ”claim 2”.
The next simplest form is a chaining of dependencies, such
as ”claim 1 depends upon claim 2, and claim 2 depends upon
claim 3”. These chains can be handled by creating one node
per claim in the chain, with each node containing its corre-
sponding claim and all subsequent claims in the chain. Less
simple is when there are OR options, such as ”claim 1 de-
pends upon either claim 2 or claim 3”. In small numbers,
these OR options can be handled by just enumerating the
possible combinations as if they were chains, but for large
systems, that is extremely inefficient.
Simple OR dependencies will be represented by a directed
−→ is used for depends upon
A −→ B is read ”A depends upon B”,
and A is called a parent of B
+ indicates concatenation
{} indicates a set of values, concatenated together
S(x) is the string for vertex x, and is defined as
S(x) = H({ parent vertices strings } + x)




Claim1 −→ Claim2 or Claim3
S(Claim1) = H(Claim1)
S(Claim2) = H(S(Claim1) + Claim2)
S(Claim3) = H(S(Claim1) + Claim3)
Output = S(Claim2) + S(Claim3)
Figure 4: Simple Dependency Example
acyclic graph (DAG). To handle these dependencies effi-
ciently, a secure hash function is used to create a path whereby
a claim is proven valid at the same time as the next node in
the graph is proven valid. We call a node that is dependent
upon another node a parent of the latter node. The node
that is depended upon is called the child node. A node is
assigned a ”string”value, which is a hash of the string values
of its parent nodes and its actual data value. Calculating
a node’s string therefore requires having the data for that
node. Just as the node (hash) values in the Merkle hash
tree define a unique set of children, each node’s string value
defines a unique set of parent nodes and its data value. In
order to tie the entire DAG down to a single value, an out-
put value is created, which is simply the set of string values
of all of the leaf nodes of the DAG.
Figure 3 shows the notation that we use, while Figure 4
shows the example described above. The example in Fig-
ure 5 shows that multiple parent nodes are efficiently han-
dled. In general, the size of the node’s value will grow sub-
linearly with the number of parents, as the extra parent
strings are amortized by the node’s actual data content.
Sets of dependencies that cannot be represented by a DAG
are not yet handled by our scheme. This includes sets of de-
pendencies with cycles, negative dependencies, and opera-
tions that cannot be represented as a combination of ANDs
and ORs (discussed next). We do not believe that neg-
ative dependencies between released claims is meaningful,
since the prover could always perform multiple, indepen-
dent showings of the signed documents. Cycles are prohib-
ited because we do not yet have an efficient, general way of
dealing with them, although a simple cycle that is not in-
terdependent on other sets of claims can be handled easily
by collapsing the entire cycle into a single claim.
Moving on to more general forms of dependencies, we wish






Claim1 −→ Claim2 or Claim3
Claim2 −→ Claim4 or Claim5
Claim3 −→ Claim4 or Claim6
S(Claim1) = H(Claim1)
S(Claim2) = H(S(Claim1) + Claim2)
S(Claim3) = H(S(Claim1) + Claim3)
S(Claim4) = H(S(Claim2) + S(Claim3)+
Claim4)
S(Claim5) = H(S(Claim2) + Claim5)
S(Claim6) = H(S(Claim3) + Claim6)
Output = S(Claim4) + S(Claim5) + S(Claim6)
Figure 5: Multiple Parents
tions. For example, ”Claim 1 depends upon one of Claim
2 or Claim 3 and upon one of Claim 4 or Claim 5”, alter-
nately written ”Claim 1 depends upon (Claim 2 or Claim 3)
and (Claim 4 or Claim 5)”. The AND operations are han-
dled by adding special AND nodes to the DAG. Placeholder
OR nodes are also added to the graph for convenience, but
they don’t necessarily show up in analysis or implementa-
tion. This example is shown in Figure 6. The AND node
has two branches for its two children. A different string is
given to each branch, represented by AND1 1 and AND1 2.
(The two AND pieces are shown without the S(x) notation,
because they aren’t actual vertex nodes in the graph.) When
the two branches are XORed together, the result is the ac-
tual value of the AND node. For an n-input AND, this is
done by generating n-1 random values (each the size of the
output of the hash function) and using them as the values
for the first n-1 branches. The final branch is the XOR of
the rest of the branches and the AND node’s value. All
of the randomly generated values are included in the string
that is hashed to get the AND node’s value (to prevent any
linear combination attacks against the XOR combination).
The example also shows how the OR nodes disappear, be-
cause their value is equal to their parents’ value. This is
still true (if slightly more complex) when such an OR node
has multiple parents; the parent values are simply concate-
nated, in the same way multiple parents of any other node
are handled.
As an example of requiring combined AND and OR de-
pendencies, imagine a table of claims, with each column con-
taining a different type of claim. Consider the rule that to
access an element of the first column requires also showing
(at least) one element of every other column. Using our
method, this requires a graph containing one node for ev-
ery element in the table, a single AND node, and one OR




AND1 −→ OR1 and OR2
OR1 −→ Claim2 or Claim3
OR2 −→ Claim4 or Claim5
S(Claim1) = H(Claim1)
S(AND1) = H(S(Claim1) + AND1 1)
AND1 1 = Random value, of size |H|
AND1 2 = S(AND1) xor AND1 1
S(OR1) = AND1 1
S(OR2) = AND1 2
S(Claim2) = H(S(OR1) + Claim2)
= H(AND1 1 + Claim2)
S(Claim3) = H(S(OR1) + Claim3)
= H(AND1 1 + Claim3)
S(Claim4) = H(S(OR2) + Claim4)
= H(AND1 2 + Claim4)
S(Claim5) = H(S(OR2) + Claim5)
= H(AND1 2 + Claim5)
Output = S(Claim2) + S(Claim3)+
S(Claim4) + S(Claim5)
Figure 6: Combining AND and OR
Prover provides:
Output = S(Claim2) + S(Claim3)+
S(Claim4) + S(Claim5)
S(Claim2) = H(AND1 1 + Claim2)
S(Claim4) = H(AND1 2 + Claim4)
S(AND1) = H(S(Claim1) + AND1 1)
S(Claim1) = H(Claim1)
Verifier checks:
Output is signed (in the hash tree)
All hash values are correct
S(AND1) = AND1 1 xor AND1 2)
Figure 7: Showing claims 1, 3, and 4
node for each column but the first two. Additionally, the
OR nodes can be removed, because they are not necessary,
as mentioned previously.
4.2 Protocols for Usage
In general, a set of claims will have some claims with
no dependencies and other groups of claims that are inter-
dependent. To handle this situation, we combine the struc-
tures described in the previous subsection with the hash-
tree-based readactable signature scheme from our prior work.
Each group of inter-dependent claims is represented by a
DAG and a single signed output value is generated for each
such group. Each of these signed output values then be-
comes a node in the overall hash tree, along with each of
the claims that have no dependencies associated with them.
As in the prior approach, the certifier signs the root value
of this hash tree and places it in a PKI certificate.
To show a claim that has dependencies requires showing
more claims to fulfill those dependencies. We refer to a claim
and one set of additional claims that fulfills the dependen-
cies as a chain. The term ”chain” is not strictly accurate,
since the chain will have multiple branches if it has any
AND nodes, and those multiple branches may even connect
together (ie, not a tree). There can be no loops, per the
constraint that dependencies must be in the form of a DAG.
As an example, consider the graph of Figure 6 and the
case of showing ”Claim1”, ”Claim3”, and ”Claim4”. The
prover must provide to the verifier the input strings that
were hashed to create the string values of each of the claims
being shown and the AND node on the path, along with the
(signed) output value. The input string for a claim node
includes the actual data of that claim, so the data for the
three claims is included in what is shown. Figure 7 sum-
marizes what the prover shows and what the verifier needs
to verify. The only additional values given to the verifier
that are not used are S(Claim4) and S(Claim5). These are
the string values for the other two leaf nodes, and contain
just the hash output. Under the assumption that the hash
function is secure (can’t be inverted and doesn’t leak data),
then no data is leaked by these extra strings, except for the
knowledge of their existence.
4.3 Relation to prior work
The mechanism for handling dependencies obviously shows
a family relationship to the Merkle hash tree. It in fact looks
like a backward tree, where instead of a root node verifying
the values of many leaf nodes, a set of leaf nodes can verify
the value of a set of root nodes (and all of the intermediate
nodes as well). In most of our examples, the set of leaf nodes
is much larger than the set of root nodes, but that is simply
selection bias of the examples.
5. SECURITY
A secure scheme requires some additional details beyond
those described in the previous section. First and foremost,
the claims must have random padding to prevent a dictio-
nary attack, because the hash value of unreleased claims is
necessarily provided to a verifier. Second, and related, is
that the values of nodes should be unambiguous about what
they contain. Throughout this paper, the value of nodes
is represented by a simple concatenation of values. In our
actual implementation, we include additional meta-data be-
tween the fields.
There is an alternative to the random padding of claims;
substituting a collision-resistant message authentication code
(MAC) function such as HMAC in place of the plain hash
function. In this situation, a unique key must be used for ev-
ery node, with the key being revealed to the verifier when a
node is proven. We do not see any advantage of this method
over the random padding of the claims.
The specific attacks the system needs to be secure against
include forgery, loss of privacy, and violation of dependen-
cies. Next, we provide informal analyses of the security of
the approach against these attacks.
5.1 Forgery
Forgery covers all cases where the verifier is convinced
that a claim is certified by a particular entity, when it was
not. Forgery covers several different problems, depending on
what part of the system is attacked. For example, a forger
can try to attack the hash function to create a bad final or
intermediate value. A secure hash function will prevent this
type of attack.
A forger can try to pass off data as if it were part of the
structure, or vice versa. This style of attack is only possible
if the construction of nodes’ strings is done in a simplistic
manner, such as merely concatenating the values. By adding
meta-data – such as a count of the number of fixed-sized
fields, before the start of the variable-sized data field – the
contents of the string can be made unambiguous, clearly de-
marcating structure and data. Additional meta-data (such
as marking whether a node is an AND or data node) can
provide further reassurance, and may be necessary for a for-
mal proof of security. Meta-data might also be required in
specific applications of the approach. For example, if applied
to documents, the order of the claims (words) is important
and this information can be provided in the meta-data in
the form of sequence numbers. If knowing the sizes of the
gaps in the provided text is important, contiguous sequence
numbers are used. Otherwise, random increments between
consecutive sequence numbers can avoid release of extra in-
formation such as the precise number of words that were
redacted from a particular section.
A forger could also try to fake a valid looking AND node.
The AND node construct of XORed masks is a trivial se-
cret sharing scheme, while having the masks inside of the
hashed string is a constraint on the values of shares that are
accepted. This constraint is necessary to eliminate the possi-
bility of generalized birthday attacks [17], although we hope
that these attacks would not be practical on the system even
without such a constraint. The problem of faking an AND
node can be reduced to the problem of creating a collision in
a hash function defined as H(x + {yi}) = H
′(x + {yi}) xor
{yi}, where H
′(x) is an assumed to be secure hash function
and {yi} is an arbitrarily sized set of values. We assume this
is not possible since breaking this structure is equivalent to
breaking the underlying hash function.
5.2 Loss of Privacy
A loss of privacy occurs when releasing some claims or
data exposes additional claims or data that the holder did
not intend to release. In our system, the most obvious way
for additional data to leak is through hashes of unreleased
data being (necessarily) revealed. Under the assumption of a
secure hash function, no information about the data should
be directly leaked by its hash value. However, if the data
itself is in a guessable form and of low entropy, then a dic-
tionary attack may be performed against the hash. Adding
random padding is our recommended solution to this prob-
lem. The padding can either be independently generated
and stored for each data value, or it can be generated using
a pseudorandom function along with a random seed value.
5.3 Violation of Dependencies
A violation of dependencies occurs when a holder is able
to release certified data to a verifier in a way that the veri-
fier can determine that it was certified, while not releasing
other data as required by the certifier. Please note that in
this case, security is done on a ”can prove” basis, where it
doesn’t matter how the certified data is proven. In particu-
lar, the verifier does not have to follow established protocols
or intentions. (Put simply, we do not assume that the veri-
fier is not an honest player in the system.)
Dependencies are enforced by providing chains, such that
each link in the chain must be fully verifiable in order for the
next link to be verifiable. Additionally, to verify a (data)
link requires the actual data for that node to be known
and used by the verifier. These chains overlap, creating the
DAG. There are two general ways to violate the dependen-
cies: forging a link in the chain and finding a different way
(than following the chain) to prove a claim. The first of
those is covered by the subsection on forgery, discussed pre-
viously. The second is beyond the scope of this paper, as it
covers application-specific side-channels, and is dependent
upon the implementation and use of the system.
5.4 Other
There is an additional class of attacks that are of less con-
cern, namely attacks by the certifier of the data. The only
meaningful attack we can see is the certifier putting a hid-
den channel into the signature, without the knowledge of the
user. As we generally expect the certifier to provide the data,
define the dependencies, and create the actual structures of
the signature, we consider attempting to identity and pre-
vent all possible hidden channels as beyond the scope of this
paper. Since in all applications we can imagine for the ap-
proach, the user has an inherent trust relationship with the
certifier, we do not consider this issue a serious one.
6. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
Good performance for large systems of dependencies was
a primary goal of this work. Two evaluations of the system
in meeting that goal are provided. The first evaluation is in
the form of analytical bounds, while the second evaluation
is based on experimental results from an implementation of
the scheme.
6.1 Analytical Bounds
In addition to being relatively easy to understand, our
system as described so far provides clear bounds on space
and time complexity. For example, there is exactly one ver-
tex node for each claim, and the actual data of each claim
is stored and hashed only once. There is a maximum of one
vertex for each AND and OR as well (multiple ANDs and
ORs may be combined).
For comparison to our system, consider a brute-force ap-
proach to handling dependencies. All possible combinations
of claims necessary to satisfy a particular claim’s release pol-
icy can be combined and treated as a single claim. For small
graphs, this can actually be quite efficient. However, con-
sider the example given before of a table of claims, with the
rule that to access an element of the first column requires
also showing (at least) one element of every other column.
As noted before, the number of nodes in the graph of this
example is equal to the number of items in the table plus
one (ignoring the removed OR nodes). The approximate to-
tal size of data being hashed in the creation of the graph
is given in Equation 1, where n is the number of rows, k
is the number of columns, and assuming a symmetric table
(all columns have the same number of rows).
(n ∗ k + n + k − 3) ∗ |H| + |all data items| (1)
Thus, our solution is O(n ∗ k) in space and time while enu-
merating all possible combinations is O(nk).
6.2 Trade-offs
There are a number of trade-offs that can be made be-
tween storage space and speed. For example, separate, smaller
DAGs can be calculated and stored for every claim that
is involved in a dependency calculation, allowing for quick
retrieval and verification of single claims and verification
chains. Alternately, a single large DAG (or a small set of
medium sized DAGs) can be used, which can greatly increase
the amount of data necessary to verify a single claim (and
chain), but which is much more efficient to store and verify
large sets of claims (with overlapping dependency chains).
The discussion so far has assumed a single, monolithic
DAG is used. A single monolithic graph is easier to describe,
program, and analyze. However, a multiple graph approach
can produce better results in a ”best-case”scenario. As such,
both a monolithic version and a multiple graph version were
implemented for experimental performance testing. To pro-
vide the best contrast, the multiple graph version makes and
stores a separate DAG for every claim.
6.3 Experimental Setup
A Java implementation of just the dependency handling
portion of the system was written and tested. All tests were
performed on a Dell PowerEdge 2900 server with dual Xeon
5150 CPUs running at 2.66 GHz using Sun’s 64-bit server
JVM, version 1.6.0 06. The code was single threaded and
the server otherwise idle. The minimum time seen over the
course of multiple rounds was recorded, to avoid artifacts
from the just-in-time compilation and garbage collection.
SHA-256 is used for the hash function [10].
Two styles of input dependency graphs were used, both
rectangular tables. Using this format, it was easy to vary
the number of rows, number of columns, and size of data
in each claim (constant across all claims in a table to make
the results more consistent). The first style matched the
example analyzed earlier, where a table of claims has the
requirement that to release any claim in the first column
requires releasing (at least) one value from each of the other
columns as well. This graph is fast to process, as would
be expected from the earlier bounds discussion and some
simple analysis (most of the nodes in the graph are of low
degree, with the connections concentrated in the AND and
OR nodes).
The second graph is a table where each column is de-
pendent upon the next column in order. More specifically,
showing any claim in any column except the final column














2 4 8 16 32
Figure 8: Verifying a Chain in 2nd Graph Style
(For claims in the first column of the table, the behavior of
this graph style is the same as for the previous graph style.)
This graph is denser in connections than the first graph, with
all nodes being of degree n (for the first or last column) or
2 ∗ n (for all other columns).
6.4 Experimental Results
6.4.1 Absolute timings
Handling of dependencies is efficient for most cases, as
can be seen in Table 1, which shows representative timing
data for the first graph style. Most of the operations take
just milliseconds. However, the largest value in the table
is five seconds for verifying all claims in the multiple graph
representation. Thus, the multiple graph approach can be
very inefficient when the number of claims to be verified is
very large.
The table shows some oddities, compared to the simple
complexity analysis. For example, the monolithic graph is
fairly close to linear in the number of rows, but sub-linear
in the number of columns. The reason for this is that op-
erations that are ignored in our complexity analysis (i.e.,
comparing values, identifying which child/parent a node is)
dominate the execution time.
This is shown even more clearly by the second style of
input. This second style has the same complexity bound
as the first style, but is much slower in practice due to the
very high density of connections. In particular, the time to
pre-generate all of the chains in the multiple graph approach
make it impractical, even when the chain verification time
is very small. As such, the following figures only show the
monolithic graph timings.
Figure 8 shows the time (in milliseconds) for verifying a
single chain in a monolithic graph (first timing column in
Table 1) using the second style of input. This time is very
small (at most tens of milliseconds), even when the numbers
of rows and columns become large. Figure 9 shows the time
(in milliseconds) for verifying the entire monolithic graph
(second column in Table 1) using the same data. This time
is also reasonable, being less than one second even for large
cases.
6.4.2 Relative timings
While absolute timings are important for identifying whether
Input Table Size Monolithic Graph Multiple Graph
Rows Columns Data size Verify chain Verify all Verify chain Verify all
Small inputs
4 4 10 360 330 120 450
4 8 10 520 460 200 660
4 16 10 960 890 400 1500
4 32 10 1900 1800 950 3600
Medium inputs
64 16 100 1700 8200 1300 77,000
64 32 100 3400 17,000 4400 280,000
64 64 100 6800 34,000 19,000 1,200,000
64 128 100 15,000 74,000 77,000 5,000,000















2 4 8 16 32
Figure 9: Verifying Full Graph in 2nd Graph Style
the system is viably efficient, relative timing between differ-
ent options is also instructive.
For example, Table 1 shows little advantage to the mul-
tiple graph approach, which is supposed to be a speed-up.
Figure 10 provides a different view, showing the relative ad-
vantage of the multiple graph over the monograph. (This
graph is based on the first input style and a data size of
10 bytes.) It can be clearly seen that the multiple graph
approach provides a significant advantage—about 35 times
faster for the peak in the figure—for some parameter values.
In particular, it does best with a large number of rows and a
small number of columns. The area to the right of the first
contour line is where the monolithic graph performs better.
Thus, the optimum implementation approach is depen-
dent on the nature of the release dependencies. However,
from a worst-case standpoint, the monolithic graph imple-
mentation appears to be better.
7. APPLICATION TO PATIENT MEDICAL
DATA
One of the application areas where these ideas are being
implemented is healthcare, in the Georgia Tech and Chil-
dren’s Healthcare of Atlanta MedVault project [8]. This
work is currently in progress and some of the components
are ready for integration with the whole system. Depen-




















































































Figure 10: Relative Time to Verify a Single Depen-
dency Chain
medical documents not be disclosed unless other related doc-
uments are also disclosed. For example, a patient’s medical
report may not be disclosed unless the doctor’s consultation
and the clinical lab report are also disclosed. These types of
dependencies can be created in the disclosure policy. For im-
plementing these dependencies, the proposed cryptographic
scheme can be used.
Figure 11 shows the architecture of a service that main-
tains a personal health record (PHR) database by aggregat-
ing a patient’s medical records from various sources. The
patient has a personalized agent to provide authorization
service for the PHR repository. The authorization scheme is
policy based, where the patient can set his disclosure poli-
cies. These policies are attribute-based and hence the pa-
tient defines a set of attributes that a requester must hold in
order to access particular records. The repository holds the
PHR which is composed of a number of medical records. The
agent and the repository form a single unit as shown in the
figure. This architecture is loosely based on the health care
use case from [11], which can be considered a specification
for systems that permit patients to access their own health














Figure 11: Architecture of the PHR service
Healthcare providers, such as hospitals, clinical labs, on
site emergency care units etc., are entities that generate
medical records about the patient and these records are
added to the repository. These providers are the certifiers in
our terminology and make use of the proposed dependency-
aware redactable signature scheme in order to sign the records
that they provide to the repository. The patient’s personal
medical devices also generate medical records about the pa-
tient and are useful in monitoring the patient’s condition on
a regular basis. The healthcare professionals require these
personal health records to provide medical care to the pa-
tient. This medical care can be emergency, definitive or
general. Healthcare professionals contact the patient’s agent
and request some records. Upon authentication and check-
ing the authorization policies, the agent retrieves the records
from the repository and sends them to the requesting pro-
fessional. Although the medical records are being provided
by the patient himself, the authenticity of the records can be
verified as they are digitally signed by the originating entity.
The patient can set attribute-based authorization policies
in his personalized agent. He specifies specific sets of ver-
ifiable attributes that the requesting medical professional
should posses in order to access documents from a particu-
lar category. These attributes are provided to the medical
professionals by identity agents who assert them by digitally
signing them and creating a certified credential. The policy
engine is based on the XACML standard [4]. When the pa-
tient specifies his policies, the XACML policy description
point (PDP) converts them into XACML policy files. When
a request for access is made to the agent, the agent responds
with a set of attributes required for that access. When the
requester provides the credentials, they are verified and the
access request and the attributes are given to the policy
evaluation point (PEP) in XACML. The PEP evaluates the
request based on the patient’s policy and responds with ap-
prove or deny. In case the request is approved, the agent
accesses the appropriate piece of the health record from the
repository, along with any other entries that the requested
piece is dependent upon, and sends them to the requester.
Using the proposed method, medical data from multi-
ple authorities can be combined together to form an aggre-
gate report to be presented to the healthcare professional.
Let’s consider the previous example where the patient can-
not disclose his medical report unless the doctor’s consul-
tation and the clinical lab report are also disclosed. Fur-
ther assume that the clinical lab report contains the pa-
tient’s blood pressure and it can be substituted by a re-
port from the patient’s personal device. If the medical re-
port is represented by MedReport, the doctor’s report by
DocReport, the clinical report by ClinReport and the blood
pressure device reading by BPReading, then we have the
following: ”MedReport −→ DocReport and (ClinReport or
BPReading)”
The policy can be cryptographically encoded so that pol-
icy enforcement is done in a natural way. In the present
example, even if the medical report is disclosed without its
dependencies by mistake, it cannot be verified or trusted by
the requester.
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